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Facts as social action in political debates about the European Union 
Abtract 
This paper focuses on the argumentative role of making factual claims and counterclaims in 
broadcast political debates. Despite the rise of “post-truth politics”, this paper argues that 
orientations to issues of ‘fact’ and ‘truth’ are a live and controversial matter when debating 
the European Union. Using Discursive Psychology (DP) the analysis is on how politicians 
use fact-based (counter)claims in multi-party interactions, in the form of debates about the 
UK and the European Union. Three types of factual challenges are presented to illustrate the 
rhetorical function of claims: challenging the essence of an argument, providing another fact 
to re-contextualise the preceding fact and using hypothetical scenarios to undermine facts. 
The analysis demonstrates that the use of facts is a highly strategic, argumentative, matter. 
This study, understood against a backdrop of the rise of “post-truth politics”, highlights that 
concepts of ‘fact’ and ‘truth’ are not done away with; rather they are an argumentative 
resource and need to be understood in their fragmentary and rhetorical context. 
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Political psychology, being a problem-focused field, has developed as a response to social 
issues (Nesbitt-Larking & Kinnvall, 2012). In order to stay relevant, it must be able to 
develop analytical frameworks appropriate to a ‘globalising world’ (ibid.). Indeed, as Tileagă 
(2013, p. 187) has noted, “one of the major challenges of political psychology rests with how 
best to promote alternative ways of doing political psychology”. One area where something 
novel can be brought is in the study of political communication. The analysis and scrutiny of 
politicians’ talk, in speeches or debates, has become particularly prominent in light of far-
reaching political events such as the latest US elections and the UK’s decision to leave the 
European Union. It is a prominent area where ideologies conflict. Much of the way these 
issues are framed as political, controversial, worthy of public attention and so forth are 
through media, of which broadcast political debates are a prominent feature. Therefore, it is 
crucial that one has the appropriate scientific tools, quantitative and qualitative, to analyse 
these debates. 
The research on British political discourse covers a wide range of topics, with the work 
ranging from psychological (Márquez, 2010) to political science (Hay & Smith, 2010) and 
beyond. These studies provide a good overview of how political discourse(s) may unfold. 
The contribution of Discursive Psychology (DP) is to look at discourse in a detailed, 
situated, manner (e.g., Edwards & Potter, 1992), but for now it is worth pointing out that DP 
enables us to look at multi-party interactions in a political setting, an area so far relatively 
under-researched, in a detailed manner. Multi-party interactions are a widespread practice in 
Western democratic societies, often in the form of debates or political talk shows. Thus, even 
though this paper analyses debates about the relationship between the EU and UK, it also 





There has been talk of the rise of ‘post-truth politics’ – that is, the increased media attention 
and electoral success of politicians who can be broadly defined as populist or advocates of a 
populist agenda. This may well indicate that the nature of political discourse is changing, but 
it would be an oversimplification to state that for post-truth political discourse “truth and 
consistency are unimportant” (Paxton, 2017, pp. 22). In fact, the case may even be the 
opposite, and I will return to this point later. 
Being a relatively novel concept spoken in conjunction with contemporary political 
discourse, there is little research into ‘post-truth politics’ (Lockie, 2017). Some newspaper 
articles decry ‘post-truth politics’ as a move away from the realm of facts, into that of 
emotional appeal (e.g., Suiter, 2016). The scholarly response has been notably slower, but it 
has, for the most, also been more cautious in prescribing what ‘post-truth politics’ may 
mean. In psychology, Muñoz (2017) argues along similar lines; that we could to seek to 
understand the persuasive potential of ‘post-truth politics’ because of its emotional appeal 
(as a somatic marker) to the individual. However, this argument takes ‘post-truth politics’ at 
face value and tells us little of what is meant by it. Lockie (2017) acknowledges ‘post-truth 
politics’ as an issue, to a degree of a battle between emotion and fact. However, he argues 
that the matter is one of considerable complexity which cannot be resolved by ‘merely’ 
introducing more facts. What is needed is a comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon itself. A very genuine attempt at this is made by Hopkin and Rosamond (2017) 
who look at how political ‘bullshit’ (Frankfurt, 2005) has permeated British political 
discourse on economics, treating ‘post-truth politics’ as a domain particularly suited for 
‘bullshit’. Indeed, Hopkin and Rosamond note that ‘post-truth politics’ is a place “where 
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bullshit flourishes” (pp. 4). With the term ‘bullshit’ they refer to a hypothetical distinction 
between a politician speaking an untruth unknowingly: had a politician spoken the untruth 
knowingly, this would have been a lie, as it orients us to what the truth is, in a conscious 
effort to move away from it. The rise of ‘bullshit’, Hopkin and Rosamond (2017) argue, has 
come about because of the “broader hollowing out of Western democratic politics” (pp. 11). 
Political ‘bullshit’ becomes particularly corrosive because of its abundance amongst an 
electorate that consists of ‘cognitive misers’ more likely to respond to authoritative 
statements that accompany the ‘bullshit’ content. 
What Hopkin and Rosamond (2017), Lockie (2017) and Muñoz (2017) have in common is 
the recognition that ‘post-truth politics’ signifies some kind of distancing away from what 
could be conventionally called as truth or fact. That said, we do not need an absolute 
definition of what ‘post-truth politics’ is or is not, but, as a matter of paramount importance, 
we should be aware that the concern with ‘post-truth politics’ does not signify a 
straightforward move away from the concepts of ‘fact’ and ‘truth’. While newspaper articles 
may claim that ‘post-truth politics’ implies the death of ‘facts’ in political discourse, 
scholarly work is reluctant to go that far. Such a claim would be an overstatement which 
does not do justice to the complexity of the matter at hand. 
When talking of ‘bullshit’, Hopkin and Rosamond (2017) underline the importance of 
political discourse as a practice. They tend to ascribe ‘bullshit’ as a problem because it 
appeals to the voting ‘cognitive misers’; it is an untruth that is seen to taint voting behaviour. 
Their work highlights the importance of discourse, but does not address two particularly 
relevant points. First, they do not treat political discourse as argumentative in nature. 
Discourse in general, and political discourse in particular, needs to be examined in its 
argumentative context to so that we can better understand its function (Billig, 1991; 1996). 
6 
 
Instead, Hopkin and Rosamond (2017) theorise that a voter is a reluctant ‘miser’, a subject of 
political ‘bullshit’ and, faced with the Sisyphean task of seeking for the ‘truth’, votes in a 
counterproductive manner. Second, they leave the concept of ‘bullshit’ a purely abstract 
construction. They suggest no means of determining whether a politician is “actually” lying 
or ‘bullshitting’; a practicable method of distinguishing the two is absent. That said, to try to 
determine whether someone has lied or not would be to miss the point, but instead we should 
give due consideration to what bullshit does and what it argues for. ‘Bullshit’, and by 
extension ‘post-truth politics’, should be viewed less as concepts, abstract or not, in need of a 
clear operationalisation and measurement, and more as indicators of the rhetorical work that 
goes on in political discourse. ‘Post-truth politics’ perhaps ought to be less about what is 
(not) real, and more about the rhetorical action that ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ perform. 
 
Fact Construction 
As this article demonstrates, there is consistent competition between politicians over who-
knows-what and who-knows-better. This article argues that, when politicians debate the 
relationship between the UK and EU, they orient their discourse on issues of ‘truth’ and 
‘fact’, and that these play a very serious rhetorical part. The focus is on what is 
conventionally called ‘confrontational’ (e.g. Hutchby, 1996) and rhetorical (Billig, 1991) 
talk, concentrating specifically on political discourse regarding the European Union and the 
role that ‘facts’ may play in it. I am particularly interested in the discursive construction of 
factual ‘claims’ and ‘counterclaims’. That is, the range and variety of rhetorical challenges 
that politicians belonging to different political or ‘ideological’ camps set for each other, and 
the nature of the argumentative context in which these play out. The focus is on the use of, 
and orientation to, ‘facts’ and demonstrations of ‘knowledge’, and the type of argumentative 
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work they do. Billig (1991) argues that to argue for one position is to argue against its 
counterpart. If we are to take his point, we must also understand the argumentative function 
of factual descriptions and their action orientation (Edwards & Potter, 1992) in political 
discourse. Edelman (1977) argued that political language is about facts and values, and there 
are strong orientations to issues of truth and factuality. They play a central role in political 
argumentation and in trying to appeal to the audience. The argument here is that this is the 
case in contemporary debates about the European Union. The investigative aim is to explore 
how, in “post-truth politics”, facts are constructed and made relevant as argumentative 
resources. 
So how can one study the social – and, in this context, political – psychological use of ‘facts’ 
and ‘truths’ in broadcast political debates? How do politicians construct facts when debating 
against an ideological opponent? That is, how is one to go about analysing the use of factual 
accounts in situ? This article advocates a serious consideration of Discursive Psychology 
(DP) as an appropriate method of enquiry to this end. DP seeks to understand how 
psychological topics in talk (such as attitudes or attributions) are oriented to, reproduced and 
responded to by participants in the talk in a systematic and empirical manner: “the focus is 
on action, not cognition” (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p.154). Here, DP is used to analyse how 
the social construction of facts does more than inform the hearers of what the politician 
knows – they are designed to perform specific argumentative actions. It is in this capacity 
that DP can provide a powerful contribution to political psychology. The analytical approach 
proposed here seeks to contribute to political psychology from a critical, discursive, 
approach (Tileagă, 2013) which is paramount in order for us to understand the situated, 
social, nature of where the political and psychological meet. 
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DP has a history of dealing with political topics (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992). It offers a respecification of psychological phenomena as social psychological 
practices analysable in the way people talk (e.g. Tileagă, 2007). The aim is to contribute to 
this trend – to suggest that the mobilisation of facts in the context of multi-party broadcast 
political debates is, above all, argumentative and far from a non-partisan description of an 
objective truth. The intention is not to intimate what is going on the minds of the debaters. If 
one wishes to understand how people orient and respond to factual accounts in political 
debates, then one is to look at how it is attended to and treated in talk. Mobilisation of facts 
is a highly argumentative action. 
In my analysis of politicians’ talk, I contend that one can successfully marry insights from 
work on rhetorical aspects of argumentation (e.g. Billig, 1991; 1996; Billig et al., 1988) and 
more recent work on ‘epistemics’ (e.g. Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Raymond & Heritage, 
2006; Heritage, 2013) from Conversation Analysis (CA). Although rhetorical aspects of 
argumentative discourse are paramount to understanding the organisation of what might be 
called ‘confrontational’ political discourse, rhetorical analysis in and of itself is arguably not 
enough. As Billig has argued, “the meaning of discourse used in an argumentative context 
must be examined in terms of the contest between criticism and justification” (1996, p.121) 
and this is a key dimension of analysing argumentative political discourse. However, one 
also needs a dimension that takes into account the epistemic work that is being accomplished 
in talk; on account of political talk often being characterised by facts and values (Edelman, 
1977). By epistemic work I mean a range of phenomena that have something to do with 
knowledge claims one makes and how one orients to their rights to make these knowledge 
claims (Heritage, 2013). In the context of analysing debates on the European Union, the 
issue of how ‘knowledge’ is mobilised for different rhetorical purposes (including criticism 
and justification) takes on special relevance. The common assumption in work on adversarial 
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discourse is that politicians challenge each other on substantive issues, yet the focus is more 
on face-saving strategies (Bull & Fetzer, 2010), institutional constraints (Robles, 2011) and 
so forth, than on how, by way of mobilising ‘facts’ and ‘knowledge’, they jostle for 
argumentative positions of dominance regarding these issues. ‘Fact’ and ‘knowledge’ based 
claims and counterclaims derive their function as rhetorical resources from the specific 
argumentative context in which they are embedded. 
As a whole, the focus is on what might be referred to as ‘institutional’ and ‘broadcast’ talk. 
Institutional talk is usually characterised by a specific aim (Drew & Heritage, 1992), and in 
the case of televised debates, it is to have two or more opposing sides talk about an issue of 
contemporary political relevance. These debates have the possibility of informing the 
audience, for example, on the ideological stances of various politicians in a run-up to an 
election. However, one must note that these debates are not only institutional – they are also 
broadcast. Hutchby (2006) elaborates on other features relevant in broadcast talk, namely 
that there can be a mixture of institutional and everyday talk. This is in part possible because 
certain types of broadcast talk find themselves in the unclear region between being 
unscripted but also having some institutional constraints (Clayman & Heritage, 2002). The 
argument here is that in broadcast political debates the principle applies. These debates occur 
within the constraints of a specific aim – that is, the topic of the debate – of the interaction, 
thus maintaining at least some level of institutional context, while also being, to a degree, 
unscripted to allow for the debate to take place. Another crucial element is that broadcast 
talk is directed at and orients to an overhearing audience (Hutchby, 2006). It is this 
overhearing audience that the speakers can be seen to appeal to. The debaters are not trying 
to ‘persuade’ each other of the veracity of their views. Rather, debaters operate in a multi-
axial communicative environment, which includes different types of audiences, party 
constituencies, and so forth. Because these debates orient to the audience but are unscripted, 
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“each party’s capacity to realise his or her agenda is thoroughly contingent on the conduct of 
the other party” (Clayman & Heritage, 2002, p.6). This is part of a wider political pattern of 
orienting to the audience: “Political facts that disturb people and produce conflict are often 
reconstructed so that they conform to general beliefs about what should be happening” 
(Edelman, 1977, p.37). 
To have a broadcast debate implies that there is a controversy at hand. Yet, controversy over 
political matters cannot be simply taken for granted or understood as a rhetorical play against 
a background of avoiding, minimising, and mitigating threats to face. One should also be 
able to show how controversy is actually pursued and mobilised, and how ‘facts’, ‘ideas’, 
‘values’ and so forth are produced as controversial. What we commonly refer to as 
politicians’ ‘agendas’, or possibly their ‘ideologies’, are perhaps no more nor less than 
orientations to the various sources of political knowledge, and to how knowledge about the 
political world ought to be harvested, collected, and what values ought to underpin its 
appraisal. Whenever politicians articulate their opinions and agendas on social issues, they 
are doing more than merely putting forward their views, or spelling out their ready-made 
‘prejudices’. Politicians’ agendas are perhaps never fully set in advance, “nor established 
from one perspective only” (Hutchby, 1996, p. 41). In argumentative talk, things like who is 
setting the agenda, what is the agenda, what is at stake, and so forth are not decidable in 
abstract or in practice, but rather are an analytic matter, and a matter of participants’ 
orientations. Debaters must give meaning to their words, their descriptions of ‘state of 
affairs’ in a local, situated, communicative context. In order to do this, the debaters not only 
must argue that what they say is true, but that they possess relevant knowledge of the topic at 
hand and are entitled to make such assertions. As the analysis will show, the construction of 




Method & Data 
The corpus of data consists of a collection of broadcast political debates recorded between 
April 2012 and September 2014, of eight separate recordings totalling approximately three 
hours and fifty minutes of debates. Data was collected from YouTube and other television 
websites, such as the BBC, and contains either full debates or extracts from debates. The 
debates are collected from a variety of programmes such as Newsnight, Question Time, The 
Record Europe
1
, a special edition of two debates on the European Union, to name a few. 
These are all in English, and where the topic of the debate is in some way related to Britain 
and its political relationship with the European Union. Each debate consisted of at least two 
politicians of opposing stances debating against each other, with a moderator. All extracts 
have been transcribed using the Jeffersonian system (e.g. Jefferson, 1984). The extracts 
presented are designed to reflect moments where, in lay terms, argumentation and 
disagreement are prominent. These were identified from the corpus through the process of 
data collection and transcription. Specifically, moments of prominent disagreement
2
 were 
identified during the process of recording and initial transcription of the data. This is the first 
analytical step. These were chosen so that the argumentative dimension of political debates 
would be at the fore. Once enough extracts in which disagreements were prominent had been 
identified and transcribed in more detail, the focus shifted to looking at what these have in 
common with each other. The orientation to ‘facts’ and the way these are challenged stood 
out as prominent aspects of the collection. The analysis, generally speaking, draws 
inspiration from an amalgamation of literature relevant to DP. Specifically, Edwards and 
                                                 
1
 No longer running; now replaced by Daily Politics on BBC. 
2
 What is meant with prominent disagreement is moments where, in layman’s terms, the debate turns more into 
an argument and there is unequivocal disagreement between politicians of opposing ideological stances. 
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Potter (1992), Potter (1996), and literature on rhetorical psychology and epistemics (cited 
earlier) have played a central part. 
 
Analysis 
In this study I take political discourse to be about facts and values (Edelman, 1977), and that 
there is something at stake: descriptions about states of affairs, particularly facts, carry an 
argumentative force. The ‘knowledge work’ in such debates can be bidirectional. One can 
use statements of facts, such as numbers, to claim the ‘epistemic domain’ that carries the 
identity of a competent politician, or one can use their uncontested epistemic domain – for 
example, their experiences, role as party leader, nationality – to advance an argument in the 
face of their opponents. This is not to say that these initially uncontested epistemic domains 
remain so as the debates advance. They are just as susceptible to being challenged as any 
other relevant topic in these debates. The general trend in the corpus is that once a politician 
produces something that is taken as ‘fact’, or as in some manner ‘real’, by the other debaters 
it is not contested as a fact
3
. This is not to say that claims of falsehoods do not take place, as 
they certainly do, but to resort to such a response too often would be counterproductive. 
Other methods of rhetorical undermining are needed. 
Specifically, the data highlighted three ways to undermine factual claims – challenging the 
relevance of a claim, re-contextualising a claim, or offering a hypothetical challenge. What I 
contend to be a factual claim here is any type of claim by a politician about truth or reality. It 
can include reporting number-based facts as well as more straightforward descriptions of 
states-of-affairs. These ways of challenging should not be seen as an exhaustive list of the 
rhetorical means of making fact-based counterclaims. Rather, the point here is to illustrate 
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how ‘facts’ (factual versions of events, people, states-of-affairs, statistics, etc.) have a 
strongly argumentative function which warrants a closer analytical look. 
Heritage points out that “when a speaker indicates that there is an imbalance of information 
between speaker and hearer, this indication is sufficient to motivate and warrant a sequence 
of interaction that will be closed when the imbalance is acknowledged as equalised for all 
practical purposes” (2012, p.32). When considering the context of broadcast political 
debates, and indeed contested political discourse, this suggests that ‘imbalances of 
information’ can be used to warrant sequences of disagreement. The implication is that to 
indicate an imbalance of information is to warrant further, argumentative, interaction. This 
action of contesting is based on the argumentative context and ‘knowledge work’ – to 
concede ‘facts’ or a given domain of ‘knowledge’ at particular points in a debate could well 
be rhetorically damaging; hence the need for a politician in a debate to provide 
counterclaims. 
 
What is Relevant? 
Arguments can often become arguments about where its essence is located (Billig, 1996), or, 
in other words, what is the most appropriate type of discourse for a particular matter. To 
challenge the essence of the argument, that the premise is not where it should be, is to argue 
that the matter is not talked about in a way that it should be. This carries its own rhetorical 
function. 
Extract 1 demonstrates how the challenge over essence after a claim can be used to 
undermine a claim. It is from a political debate between Nigel Farage of the United Kingdom 
                                                                                                                                                      
3
 Claims of dishonesty seem to be a rare case; consequently their discussion is left for another time. 
14 
 
Independence Party (UKIP) and Nick Clegg, the then-leader of the Liberal Democrat party, 
who at the time was Deputy Prime Minister. Nick Ferrari moderated the debate. The sections 
of analytical interest are highlighted in bold; this is also the case for subsequent extracts. 
Extract 1 
CLE: let’s bear down on the loopholes let’s make sure people do 1 
play by the rules but let’s not scare peopleby [by ] 2 
FAR:                                               [( )] 3 
CLE: claiming things that are not true which would ↑have the 4 
CLE: consequen[ce↓      ] 5 
FAR           [(alright)] 6 
CLE: of making us poorer and putting more people out of work  7 
FAR: [[yeah you didn’t] 8 
CLE: [[t h a t      su]rely cannot be right. 9 
FAR: =you [↑didn’t answer the question did you↓] 10 
FER:      [( )  Nigel  Nigel  Farage           ] 11 
FAR: [[you didn’t an]swer the question 12 
FER: [[Nigel Farage ] 13 
FAR: you try to do trickery with the twenty nine million saying 14 
there aren’t twenty nine you know why cos ↑two million have 15 
left ↑already↓ 16 
AUD: {((laughter) 17 
FAR: {.h ↑um they’ve gone 18 
AUD: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXxxxx x x x x x x x x x x x} x x 19 
FAR: and they’ve gone to Italy and to ↑Spain↓} 20 
FAR: =Nick you didn’t answer the basic question 21 
(.2) 22 
FAR: .h I’m not claiming twenty ni:ne million people (.) have the 23 
right to come to Britain.24 
 
(Approximately 10 lines of transcript omitted.) 
 
CLE:                                    it is it is] not the t-case 47 
that anyone can m[ove] to this country 48 
FAR:                 [hhh] 49 
CLE: and simply claim benefits simply u- 50 
CLE: [[live here ] 51 
FAR: [[↑didn’t me]ntion [benefits] 52 
CLE:                    [let me  ] let me 53 
CLE: [[let me l- let me] 54 
FAR: [[I didn’t=y- y-  ] you keep doing be[nefits] 55 
CLE:                                      [no    ] 56 
CLE: let m[e    ] 57 
FAR:      [we’re] talking about the free movement of people and 58 
FAR: the [ability] 59 
FER:     [could I] 60 
FER: could I just [make  ( )  could I ( )] 61 
FAR:              [in John’s industry    ] 62 
FER: [[mister Farage  ] 63 
FAR: [[to get a ↑jo:b↓] 64 
15 
 
  X: [[     ( )       ]65 
At the start of the extract Nick Clegg argues for the positive influence of immigration, 
further implying that the anti-immigration side of the debate is not being truthful (lines 2, 4). 
It is at this point that Farage begins to repeatedly challenge Clegg on not having answered 
the question or straying off topic (lines 8, 10, 12). Rather than pick on any particular aspect 
of Clegg’s talk as contestable, Farage instead challenges Clegg by way of denying that 
Clegg’s claim is within the bounds of the topic at hand. The ‘knowledge work’ ranges from 
the use of negative interrogatives (“you didn’t answer the question did you”, line 20 – 
Heritage, 2002), which strongly indexes and projects agreement to the overhearing audience, 
to unmitigated assessments (“I’m claiming four hundred and eighty five million people have 
the total unconditional right to come to this country”, lines 36-38 – Heritage & Raymond, 
2005) and extreme case formulations that orient to a potentially disagreeing audience as well 
(“you keep doing benefits”, line 55 – Pomerantz, 1986). As a rhetorical act, claiming what 
has been said is off point does the work of challenging the entirety of the claim without 
honing in on any particular aspect of it. 
By way of claiming that Clegg’s claim is off point, a larger stretch of talk is rhetorically 
undermined, and Farage portrays himself as knowledgeable of both the topic of the debate 
and how the debate should be conducted. Crucially, Farage does so without offering an 
explicit counter to the claim of having got his numbers wrong, beyond such claim being 
‘trickery’ (line 14).In this way, the debate on the legitimacy of 29 million is left relatively 
short as Farage moves quickly to challenge Clegg on the grounds of relevance. Of course 
this is a crucial part of providing a counterclaim to having spoken an untruth but it is done 
by the indirect route of challenging the relevance of the claim as a whole, thus glossing over 
the accusation of dishonesty. Furthermore, in doing so, it projects a potential, though in this 





The focus of this section is on how politicians will produce versions or states-of-affairs by 
drawing upon ‘facts’ or factual information, and how these ‘facts’ are contested. When a 
politician described something in a factual manner in the present dataset, it was rarely treated 
as untrue. One strategy for the opponent, then, is to focus on the more contestable aspects, 
such challenging their relevance (above). However, the debates would not be debates if some 
of the ‘facts’ were not challenged in some ways. The crucial difference is context. The facts 
that do become contested, or otherwise rhetorically undermined, are often ones that can have 
a strong argumentative impact. If some facts are not treated as contestable, but equally 
cannot be heard to be left unchallenged, how can a politician provide a counterclaim against 
these?  
One strategy is to produce another ‘fact’ that in some manner undermines the previous one, 
mostly by way of challenging its relevance to the claim made. Consider the following 
example, from a debate over the UK’s EU rebate. It is an episode of The Record Europe, in 
which Nigel Farage is arguing against the EU, Graham Watson and Dan Jørgensen (absent in 
extract below) in favour of the EU and presented by Shirin Wheeler: 
Extract 2 
FAR: but=y’know this argument about what it cost British people .hh 1 
whether we talk gross or net this year our net contribution to 2 
the EU is gonno be <nine billion> pounds. and what people see 3 
(.2) .h is (.) they see in their own lives at the moment y’know 4 
the local gravedigger or sweep streete- being sAcked as a 5 
result of local government (.) ah cUts and ↑what they see ↓here 6 
7 
(Approximately 70 lines of transcript omitted) 
WAT: where Nigel’s argument falls down is he’s said it’s terrible 77 
that the UK is paying nine billion .h every every year to to- in 78 
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net to the European Union which will be case next year. .h ↑but↓ 79 
what he doesn’t point out is that we’re paying sixty billion a 80 
year for health .h we’re paying a hundred and thirty two billion 81 
a year for social security and b[enefits ] 82 
  X:                                [(coughs)] 83 
WAT: ↑for nine billion↓ it’s all that’s costing us we’re ↑getting a 84 
fantastic [deal↓ from the European] Union 85 
FAR:          [what are we ( )  about ] 86 
WAT: we’re getting the solidarity of being part (.) of an association 87 
of twenty seve[n   nations ] 88 
FAR:              [hehhehhehheh] 89 
WAT: =we’re getting the diplomatic clout that it gives us we’re 90 
getting the clout that it gives us in trade talks 91 
Here, Watson quotes Nigel Farage’s figure of £9 billion but changes the context in which it 
was originally expressed. Quoting the opponent is a particularly useful way to establish 
something as void of interest or unchallengeable by the opposition (Antaki & Leudar, 2001). 
Watson’s counterclaim not only treats Farage’s ‘fact’ as uncontested, but relies on its 
factuality to make it look less problematic when compared to the £60 billion for health 
services and £132 billion for social security and benefits. While the numerical facts go 
unchallenged, rhetorically there is a competition between particularisation and categorisation 
(Billig, 1996). Farage attempts to make the £9 billion stand apart and suggest that it is 
problematic due to it being a large amount, while Watson puts it into the same category as 
other necessary governmental costs as well as being much less in terms of cost. Further to 
highlighting the disparity in terms of cost, which in itself is a strong push towards the 
affordability and desirability of remaining in the EU, another implication to Watson’s 
counterclaim is that, by listing the cost of the EU alongside other essential costs, to take 
issue with the EU is to take issue with other crucial parts of government spending. Farage 
does not challenge Watson’s numerical facts, but he does resist (e.g. lines 86, 89) Watson’s 
formulation that the UK is “getting a fantastic deal” (lines 84-85) – and marks a shift away 
from ‘uncontested facts’ in order to challenge Watson. In this way, the battle for primacy 
over the epistemic domain of the EU remains a live, and unresolved, issue in the debate, as 
both speakers attempt to present themselves as more knowledgeable of it for rhetorical ends. 
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Speakers do not always manage to introduce a new ‘fact’ into the debate without resistance 
from other speakers. In the extract below, the ‘fact’ that Britain is not a European country 
but is a global nation instead, is not treated as factual. In order to do this I will revisit a 
section that took place immediately before the start of Extract 2. 
Extract 3 
WHE: ah saying you know you’ve given you’ve sold it= 1 
WHE: =[[down the river you’ve sold us down the river] 2 
FAR:  [[wh-  the rebate       is     because        ] the rebate was 3 
put in place for Brit’n because we are not a European country 4 
.h we are different .h our far[ming system was different] 5 
  X:                              [   (European)  ( )   you ] 6 
WHE: =£O:H [£that’s a new one] 7 
FAR:       [and  we are      ] 8 
  X:       [       ( )       ] 9 
FAR: and=and unlike your countries ((addresses Jørgensen)) 10 
JØR: okay 11 
FAR: unlike your countries. we’re a globa[l nation] 12 
JØR:                                     [  .hhh  ] 13 
(.2) 14 
FAR: we do a bigger proportion of=of our trade and our business .h 15 
with the rest of the world than <any other> European country 16 
JØR: [[((scoffs))] 17 
FAR: [[we always ] have and=and=and my hope is that we’ll go on 18 
doing that 19 
WAT: =°Den[mark is a glo]bal nation?° 20 
FAR:      [so that’s why] 21 
WAT: Germany is [a global nation?] 22 
FAR:            [no        Germ  ]any 23 
FAR: is not a global natio[n compared (with)] compared with 24 
WHE:                      [the  Netherlands?] 25 
FAR: Britain. (.) they’re not none of them are we have a much 26 
greater- proportion of trade across the world but=y’know this 27 
argument about what it cost British people .hh28 
Here, Farage is resisted on two claims: that Britain is not a European country, and that it is a 
global nation whereas other European countries are not. The first statement of ‘fact’ is 
resisted, uncharacteristically, by the moderator
4
. This is done by the use of ‘oh’ to signify a 
change of her mental state (Heritage, 1984), adopting a less serious tone to downgrade the 
seriousness of the claim, and voicing the claim as unexpected. The latter point indexes the 
notion that such a claim is potentially beyond the bounds of the debate. The second claim, 
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that other nations are not global, is resisted by Watson and the moderator with both of them 
listing countries as examples. It is crucial that Watson is the one offering the resistance, 
although Farage’s claim is visibly addressed to Jørgensen. This is because Farage has 
invoked his ‘British’ identity by the use of ‘we’ (line 12) when addressing Jørgensen which 
simultaneously projects (Zimmermann, 1998) a ‘non-British’ identity on him, making salient 
a category-bound inappropriateness for Jørgensen to question the nature of Britain. Any 
reply by Jørgensen would index an ‘exposure’ of his interest (Edwards & Potter, 1992; 
Potter, 1996). Watson, on the other hand, can offer the resistance as someone who the 
comment was not addressed to and, especially, as another British person. Having another 
British person respond to Farage’s claim resists the notion that his view is a British one, and 
as such, challenges Farage on having exclusive rights to the epistemic domain related to 
Britain or ‘Britishness’. This demonstrates how identities can be invoked to perform an 
occasioned form of action (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998), national in this instance, and how 
a similar invocation by another person present can be used to challenge this. Farage orients 
to this challenge by Watson by interrupting his conversational trajectory to respond to 
Watson (lines 21, 23). He has to offer some form of proof for his claim (proportion of trade 
across the globe) to someone with equal access to the same epistemic domain where his 




The previous section focused on how debaters in broadcast political debates produce new 
information by way of facts, to provide a new context to the previously stated fact by their 
                                                                                                                                                      
4
 Moderators are, generally speaking, expected to follow an image of neutrality (Clayman, 1992). 
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opponent. Another way to produce a new piece of information is by way of hypotheticals. 
That is, a politician, in their counterclaim, will state something that could happen rather than 
something that is a stated fact. It may seem counterintuitive to discuss hypothetical scenarios 
in conjunction with those that orient to ‘facts’, but, as this section demonstrates, a functional 
construction of a hypothetical scenario still rests on ‘factuality’ in the sense that 
hypotheticals have to be feasible. It is the orientation to ‘facts’ that lends this feasibility to 
them. 
Of relevance here is Conversation Analytic research into if/then formulations, where these 
are treated by other speakers as part of the same ‘unit’ even in extended turns (e.g. Lerner, 
1991, Mazeland, 2007, and Kitzinger, 2008). That is, an ‘if’ formulation will project a 
(presumably) relevant ‘then’ segment to follow it. This can have a rhetorical dimension too, 
in that it can be used for claims and counterclaims. For example, a politician in a debate can 
use an ‘if’ to project that what they are saying is not the whole part of their claim without the 
‘then’. This can be particularly useful when there is a fight for the floor and the debater is 
interrupted. In argumentation, there need not be only the use of these words. In using a 
hypothetical, this kind of paired structure is implicit. In producing a hypothetical scenario, 
the onus is on the debater to also explain the meaning of the hypothetical to the interaction at 
hand. Hypothetical scenarios can be a particularly effective rhetorical device in another 
sense too, as they allow a politician to put out an argument without having to offer 
accountability for its factuality at the time. Furthermore, this device allows the politicians to 
continue to battle to present themselves as more ‘knowledgeable’ in the face of having to 
counter a seemingly uncontested statement of ‘fact’. 
Extract 4 is from the first of two debates between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage in early 
2014. The debates, taking place on the 26
th
 of March and 2
nd
 of April, between the two then 
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party leaders, in the run up to the 2014 European parliament elections, focused particularly 
on the relationship of the UK with the EU. The first debate was moderated by Nick Ferrari. 
At this particular point, the topic of the talk is about the laws related to tourism set by the 
EU. The audience in these debates have been selected based on their position in the EU 
debate, ensuring that there is an even split between those who might support Clegg or 
Farage. As such, audience participation and support by applause occurs in reaction to both 
speakers. 
Extract 4
CLE: I chuckle no:w >but it< wasn’t funny then. .hhh They got 1 
caught up in the Greek (.) legal system.=They ended up (.) <in 2 
Greek jail.> (.) .hh They had n:o id>ea what was being< told 3 
them, They had No >idea what w- charges were being< brought 4 
against them, .hh They had <no legal assistance.> .hhh The 5 
EUropean Union has now pa:ssed new rules, new laws, .hh 6 
which means that if Any of you ((gestures to audience)) (0.6) 7 
Go on holiday,=ELsewhere in the European Un°ion° and you find 8 
yourself on the wrong side of the law, .hhh you’ll get help 9 
with interpretation, .hh you’ll get legal help, >you’ll get 10 
as<[sistance,= 11 
FER:   [All: right. 12 
FAR:  [(H)Ehhh            [#hehhh       [#heh  [#hahhh 13 
CLE: =[<Guess what> UKIP [did.    They [voted [against=  14 
FAR:  [#hehh        [#hehh 15 
CLE: =[All of those [measures, 16 
FAR:: [(I di- you-)]      [h e h=.h h h ]            17 
CLE:  [<   A No   t]her ex[ample> of the] European U[nion 18 
FAR:                                                [Yeah, 19 
CLE: <Keeping u[s     safe   ]and pro[TECting ou:r [rights.> 20 
FAR:           [Ah(h)yeah hah]       [heh]         [hehehahhh= 21 
FAR: =But if you get [arres[ted in Spai:n 22 
FER:                 [Nigel- 23 
AUD:                       [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx= 24 
AUD: =[xxxxxxx 25 
FER:  [Nigel Farage,= 26 
AUD:  [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 27 
FAR: =[If you- if you get arrested in Spai:n, Ni:ck,  28 
AUD: xxxxxx= 29 
FAR: =You get arrested in Spai:n, (0.2) >for something you< 30 
haven’t do:ne, (0.2) you may be left, (.) up to eighteen 31 
months in prison, (.) without even facing a charge. .h 32 
We have a system of common law in this country, .hh 33 




(Approximately 35 lines of transcript omitted.) 
 
FAR:                  [°Yea°]       [I’ve been in >the European 71 
Parliament< now FIFteen years. They’re getting a bit <cheesed 72 
off> at me over there I’ve gotta tell you. .hhh And I:= 73 
AUD:  [heh (h)ahah(h)ah[ah 74 
FAR: =[.hh have not,   [I have not voted, (0.2) In fifteen years, 75 
(0.2) for one (.) single piece of 76 
FAR: legislation, (.) [That has= 77 
FER:                  [#All right, 78 
FAR: =added to the power base of the >European Commission in 79 
Brussels,< [<and I never,>           80 
CLE:           [Even when it m- <even wh[en it mea:ns,>]  81 
FAR:                                    [I n e v e r   ](.) 82 
FAR: Ev[er 83 
CLE:   [British to[urists, 84 
FAR:              [will. 85 
CLE: Even [when it means British tourists,] (0.2) Who get= 86 
FAR:      [<I  n e v e r   e v e r> will. ] 87 
CLE: =cau:ght 88 
CLE: up, (.) [on the wrong side of the l]aw:, (.) When on= 89 
FAR:         [< I  nev e r  w i:l l_ >  ] 90 
CLE: =Holid[ay, who need] (.)Translation,= 91 
FAR:       [<I believe>] 92 
CLE: =They need help¿ they l[aw:y ers,= 93 
FER:                        [All right 94 
CLE: >They need< as[sistance, 95 
FAR:               [Nick I: belie[ve (I mean) 96 
CLE:                             [Why is it that UKIP dogma is so 97 
strong now, .hhh You [<won’t eve]n help,> .hhh 98 
FER:                     [(        )] 99 
CLE: British [tou:rists when they’re on the >wr[ong side] 100 
FAR:         [I’ll tell you-                   [let me- ] 101 
CLE: o’ the< law:, 102 
CLE: [[.hh  103 
FAR: [[I’ll [>tell you what th-< >>I’Ll TELl you WHA-<<] 104 
CLE:        [O n :    ho li day     e l s e w h e r e  ] 105 
(.) 106 
CLE: [[I just 107 
FAR: [[I can- [I’LL TELL WHAT THE DOGmer is, The DOGmer is= 108 
CLE:          [((shakes head with grimace)) 109 
CLE:  [((shakes head)) 110 
FAR: =[I believe (.) the best people to govern Brit’ain: are the 111 
British people themsel:ves, (0.2) 112 
FAR: not [the European [Union. 113 
CLE:     [I’m talking [about the British- 114 
AUD:     [xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 115 
FER:                   [Okay.=We should-  116 
FAR: [That’s (   )  ] 117 
FER: [Let’s move on,] 118 
AUD: [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 119 
In this extract, Clegg is going to some lengths to describe the work done by the EU in favour 
of the people. Note the delicacy regarding agency and action he uses when speaking of why 
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‘these laws’ might be of relevance to the audience (lines 7-11). Why would Clegg use an 
expression “wrong side of the law” instead of, say, “breaking the law”? If choice of words 
regarding descriptions is indicative of one’s argumentative interest and stake then this 
softening around a sensitive topic is revealing. Not only does Clegg have to manage his 
argumentative claims in regard to someone who is challenging him, but he must do so in a 
way that orients and appeals to the overhearing audience. Furthermore, this orientation does 
the work of portraying the issue as one that is relevant to an audience member. Here, a 
hypothetical is used for rhetorical work but not by way of challenging Farage directly. The 
use of a hypothetical allows for a more delicate approach to making a point when its validity 
is reliant on the notion of an audience member – in other words, someone the speaker seeks 
to affiliate with – doing something socially undesirable. This way, Clegg is able to put forth 
his position without insinuating that members of the audience are in some way inclined to 
break the law. In terms of challenging Farage, it is done by arguing that the EU is acting in 
the interests of the audience and it is something that UKIP voted against. 
In broadcast political debates the person who is argued with is not necessarily the one who is 
to be persuaded. This, arguably, has a consequence in the way these debates unfold. It allows 
a politician to be much more assertive in the debates, especially where hypothetical scenarios 
are concerned. For example, later on in Extract 4, on lines 97-98, 100 and 102, Nick Clegg 
poses a question. This is directly addressed toward the UKIP/Farage ‘ideological’ side of the 
debate. Such a strong assertion about Clegg’s opponent would do little by way of 
‘persuading’ them. This, understandably, may not be the aim in the first place. Such a 
separation between who is argued with and who is appealed to can be understood to make 
available certain argumentative resources – such as making direct assertions regarding the 
ideological opposition that may otherwise be less frequent; here by way of claiming that 
UKIP are governed by dogma against the interests of the British audience. This separation 
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adds to the ability of a debater to make certain pushes into the epistemic domain (Heritage, 
2013) of their opponent. Clegg is stating that UKIP does not support the legislation 
implemented by the EU in aid of tourists. The way this claim is weaved into the argument is 
significant. It comes after having described at length the positive work brought about by the 
EU, and brings about a sharp contrast (lines 14, 16). 
Here, the very nature of Clegg’s hypothetical scenario carries with it the implication that 
UKIP has some sort of “dogma” that dictates their behaviour. Of course this descriptive 
word carries its own implication, namely that UKIP are acting out of ‘ideological principles’ 
that contrast with reason and the interest of the people, and not in accordance with the ‘real’ 
state of affairs. One must note the way it is weaved into the argument, as this is crucial for 
the argumentative work it does. It can be viewed as the ‘then’ part of the pair, where the ‘if’ 
is the hypothetical scenario of British people getting caught up on the wrong side of the law. 
Importantly, the ‘then’ part here is framed as an accusatory question (Clayman & Heritage, 
2002). Rather than conceding Farage as the ‘more knowledgeable’, by being an accusatory 
‘then’ formulation, the question pushes for Clegg as the ‘more knowledgeable’, as the 
phrasing of it presupposes the right to assert a particular state-of-affairs – one where the 
descriptive term attributes blame (Edwards & Potter, 1992) to UKIP. 
The if/then contrast implies an element of surprise by the use of “guess what” and, as such, 
frames UKIP’s action as unexpected – in the face of the positive action by the EU and, not 
coincidentally, common sense. The use of extreme case formulation – “all of those 
measures” – to bolster the argument, to imply intentionality by Farage, and to orient to a 
potentially disagreeing audience (Pomerantz, 1986), portrays this resistance as relatively 
enduring rather than a singular case. This type of use of an extreme case formulation, to 
indicate consistency of action, is used to build up an image of interest (Antaki, 1998) which, 
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in turn, carries the association of intentionality. As such, both the earlier descriptive talk and 
the statement about what UKIP has done are rhetorically, as well as contextually, co-
dependent. This sort of exposing of the other debater’s
5
 action takes a first position – 
rhetorically, “epistemically” and sequentially – leaving the other person having to orient 
their talk in some way to what has been said. 
If the persuasion is directed at the overhearing audience gives stronger argumentative 
resources for one debater, it will also do so for the target of the stronger claim. When Clegg 
speaks of UKIP’s ‘dogma’, the directness of his claim allows an equally forceful response. 
In a sense, Farage – in lines 108, 111-112 – reclaims primacy of his (arguably) own 
epistemic domain by restating the dogma in terms of believing in the notion of ‘British 
people ruling Britain’ – precisely the main selling point of his political party which, then, 
would imply a positive thing for him and his supporters. This kind of stake confession 
(Potter, 1996), where Farage explicitly voices his interest in the matter, does the work of 
undermining the moral culpability of the said interest. It also ignores the hypothetical used 
by Clegg by orienting only to the ‘then’ part of the pair. In this way, Farage resists having to 
respond to the hypothetical scenario of British tourists on the wrong side of the law, which 
could be a rhetorically damaging notion to respond to, as UKIP voting against legislation to 
help tourists is treated as ‘fact’ by both debaters. 
Returning to an earlier stretch of the debate, Clegg’s claim (lines 14, 16) has to some extent 
pushed into Farage’s epistemic domain, insofar as he has oriented to having primary access 
to the public actions of UKIP members, and Farage does not directly challenge it. Farage’s 
counterclaim begins by the use of laughter, but the verbalised rhetorical challenge comes 
later, starting from line 22, by way of hypotheticals: If (lines 22 & 28) someone gets arrested 
                                                 
5
 In argumentative terms, in these debates there is a degree of interchangeability between a person and a 
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in Spain, then they may (line 31) be left up to eighteen months in prison (line 31) without 
facing a charge. It is the avoidance of extreme case formulations in this instance that allows 
Farage to put out a hypothetical argument. In argumentative cases, extreme case 
formulations can be particularly contestable (Hutchby, 1996), so opting for the opposite 
approach, particularly to contrast with Clegg’s claim, is designed precisely to resist 
undermining. In arguing for his position in this manner, without overtly challenging Clegg, 
Farage still manages to argue against Clegg, insofar as arguing for one position argues 
against its rhetorical counterpart (Billig, 1996). 
Not all hypotheticals are as clearly structured as the ‘if/then’ formulation, but often they will 
follow along similar lines. Consider the following example, following from Extract 2. 
Extract 5
                                                                                                                                                      
particular side or organisation they may be representing. For example, to argue against a politician’s 
competence in one area also does implicit criticism of their ‘ideological position’ and vice versa. 
WAT: ↑for nine billion↓ it’s all that’s costing us we’re ↑getting a 1 
fantastic [deal↓ from the European] Union 2 
FAR:          [what are we ( )  about ] 3 
WAT: we’re getting the solidarity of being part (.) of an association 4 
of twenty seve[n   nations ] 5 
FAR:              [hehhehhehheh] 6 
WAT: =we’re getting the diplomatic clout that it gives us we’re 7 
getting the clout that it gives us in trade talks such as our 8 
FAR: =zero 9 
WAT: =free trade [agreement   with    with   eh    ] 10 
FAR:             [↑zero we don- w- we don’t ↑exist↓] 11 
WAT: India for example? 12 
FAR: =>↑we don’t exist↓< 13 
WAT: we are getting all of the benefits 14 
WAT: of all of the Eu[ropean   ] policies 15 
FAR:                 [I’m sorry] 16 
WAT: which [( ) money in the ( ) cons]tituency every ye[a r] 17 
FAR:       [Graham outside of the EU ]                 [out]side of 18 
the EU we could negotiate our own trade deal 19 
FAR: with [India   ] 20 
MIT:      [(I- In-)] 21 
FAR: as part of the EU we’re banned from 22 
FAR: doin[g so    and you talk about influence?] 23 
WAT:     [outside of       the       E:U:      ] 24 
WAT: we would be like Norway [we would ha]ve to pay more 25 
FAR:                         [it’s   n-  ] 26 
WAT: money to trade [( )] 27 
Here, Farage is introducing an example of something Britain could do outside the European 
Union: trade with India based on British interest rather than EU (lines 18-20). Note how in 
describing the hypothetical, British options are juxtaposed with the EU ones, creating an 
image of incompatibility between the two. Furthermore, Farage states what Britain could do 
outside the EU. The hypothetical carries with it what could be called an option to act without 
the necessary obligation to do so. By including this option in the hypothetical claim, it also 
implies that with the EU this is not the case, and, in fact, Farage goes on to state precisely 
that in lines 22-23. 
Watson, in this case, opts to challenge Farage on his terms. As the contested point here is a 
hypothetical one, the use of a fact may not do enough rhetorical work of counterclaiming 
Farage’s point. If Watson was to say, for example, something like “we are not outside the 
EU” it would do little by way of challenging Farage. Instead, he provides a similar 
hypothetical, which keeps the contested issue alive. In effect, Watson turns Farage’s 
formulation into an ‘if’ of an ‘if/then’ pair and provides his own ‘then’ version of events, 
which suggests that being outside the EU is not necessarily a desirable matter. The important 
difference in Watson’s resistance is that, while Farage speaks of available options (“we 
could negotiate” – line 19), he formulates his ‘then’ in deontic terms (Stevanovic & 
Peräkylä, 2012) by speaking of a negative imperative (“we would have to” – line 25).  
In suggesting that outside the EU Britain could do its own negotiations, Farage is claiming 
more than that. It is a situated response designed to challenge Watson, but it also does the 
wider rhetorical work of arguing for Farage’s anti-EU stance. It is this notion that Watson is 
challenging as much as the situated response: “When speakers say something, they are often 
doing several different things at once” (Billig, 1992, p.40). The switch from ‘could’ to 
‘would’ recognises this; it is designed to point out that Farage’s argument comes at a cost. In 
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this case, it is an economical one, and it is one that can be generally used for both sides of an 
argument (ibid.). Just as Farage is arguing for more than “UK-outside-the-EU can negotiate 
its own trade treaties”, so Watson is arguing for more than saying that this would cost Britain 
more. These claims and counterclaims orient to wider questions, such as if Britain should 
leave or stay in the European Union and why. 
 
Conclusion 
The aim has been to provide an overview of how politicians in broadcast political debates 
challenge fact-based claims; to highlight that facts play a rhetorical role. An approach that 
takes inspiration from the rhetorical work of Michael Billig and epistemic work of John 
Heritage and colleagues is advocated. Working with the notion that political discourse is 
about facts and values (Edelman, 1977), analysing the mobilisation of, orientation to, and 
responses to knowledge in talk, has a strong rhetorical function. By looking at how 
knowledge is treated in interaction in multi-party debates, it gives us an idea of how a 
politician will aim to present their views as the one that is ‘correct’ and how the others are in 
some way lacking. 
Various ways of doing disagreement, counterclaiming, were analysed where the ‘fact’ 
claimed by a speaker was challenged by an ideological opponent. These methods of 
challenging orient around three questions in particular: what is relevant, which facts matter, 
and, finally, what is hypothetically possible? These are cases where the act of challenging a 
‘fact’ has an argumentative role, and the challenge serves to undermine the other side of the 
debate and its advocates. The issue of relevance focuses on how a claim is challenged by 
questioning its relevance. The issue of which facts matter looks at how politicians can 
challenge ‘facts’ that are in and of themselves not contested. A common way of doing this is 
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to provide some other fact to alter the context in which these facts are to be debated over, 
and, as such, give a different rhetorical function to the fact. The dynamics of introducing 
new facts can change if a person with an arguably similar epistemic domain, such as a 
speaker of the same nationality challenging another on a nation-relevant issue, puts forth the 
challenge. Finally, hypotheticals are discussed. This is the introduction of potential scenarios 
based on certain actions, namely by way of using an ‘if/then’ approach. This is particularly 
useful for keeping a given issue live in the debate, because a factual response to a 
hypothetical claim may not be an effective counterclaim.  
The aim has been to demonstrate a range of ways disagreement is done in multi-party 
broadcast debates, and the central argumentative role fact construction plays in it. It is by no 
means intended as an exhaustive collection of rhetorical work that is done in broadcast 
political debates. Rather, it is to give an idea of the range of ways claims and counterclaims 
can be made, and how orientations to knowledge and facts play a role in contested political 
discourse. What this article has demonstrated is that not only are factual descriptions action-
oriented, as Potter (1996) demonstrates, but also highly rhetorical. Constructions of facts are 
not neutral reflections of an objective reality; they are rhetorical means to rhetorical ends. 
This paper has added contemporary empirical evidence, in the context of debates about the 
European Union, to Edelman’s argument that “political and ideological debate consists very 
largely of efforts to win acceptance of a particular categorisation of an issue in the face of 
competing efforts on behalf of a different one” (1977, p. 25). Using DP to analyse 
‘knowledge work’ in broadcast political debates as a vehicle for doing argumentative work is 
a highly fruitful approach, by way of showing that constructions of ‘facts’, ‘knowledge’, and 
so forth are abundant in political argumentation and play a highly rhetorical role. This should 
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lead to a much wider appreciation of the importance of political and ideological conflicts that 
factual accounts play a part in. 
This highlights another issue that needs to be addressed. The suggestion that the rise of post-
truth politics implies a decline in the importance of ‘truth’ (Paxton, 2017) needs more 
nuance. It is not enough to say truth no longer matters. On the contrary, ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ 
are rhetorical resources that are key in understanding the unfolding of political debates and 
the way claim and counterclaims are made. Far from seeing a decline on talk about ‘facts’ 
and ‘truths’, what one can see in these debates is their abundance intertwined with 
ideological argumentation. The limited but growing scholarly work recognises the 
problematic nature of ‘post-truth politics’. However it has tended not to recognise the 
rhetorical and argumentative work that is done with ‘truth’ and ‘fact’. The empirical support 
for treating political talk as concerned with facts and values has shown us the contestability 
of what might be treated as ‘fact/truth’ in order to make arguments, at least when debating 
the European Union. One need not treat political talk as only to do with facts, values or 
truths in order to appreciate the importance of these used to create political arguments. This 
is not to question the existence of the facts that have been spoken, but to recognise that the 
way they are collated and used in talk is highly strategic. Ultimately, we need to appreciate 
the fine-tuned and occasioned work that political talk does; the ways positions are advocated 
and challenged, how contested political discourse unfolds, and how knowledge orientations 
are all used to argue for or against various ideologies. As ‘ideology’ is fragmentary in its 
social and interactive context (Wetherell & Potter, 1992), so one needs to be willing to treat 
a political talk as “fragmentary, unfinished and relative to the contexts in which it is 
performed” (Tileagă, 2013, p.188) in order to provide for a more exhaustive understanding 
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